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THE PARENT FIRST: 



AN ANSWER 

TO DR. BOUQUILLON'S QUERY, 

"EDUCATION: TO WHOM DOES IT BELONG?" 



\ , BY 



REV. RJ^^'l. HOLAIND, S.J. 



NEW YORK. CINCINNATI, CHICAGO: 

BKN2:iGKR BROTHERS, 

Printers to the Holy Apostolic See. 
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PREFACE. 



Last night we had the good fortune to receive a pamphlet written 
by the eminent Dr. Bouquillon, professor of moral theology at the 
Catholic University of America. To those who have the honor of 
knowing the distinguished writer it is needless to say that his little 
book is teeming with erudition ; it is, moreover, highly interesting, 
for it deals with the burning question of the rights of the civil power 
with regard to the education of children. The Doctor says very truly 
that a clear exposition of the principles underlying the school ques- 
tion must prove both useful and opportune at this hour, " when the 
practical difficulties in which it is involved have become national 
concerns." He tells us that in the pages of his pamphlet theoretical 
prmciples only are dealt with, but he knows that these theoretical prin- 
ciples bear directly on practice ; he is fully aware that both in Wis- 
consin and Illinois they have given rise to a sturdy political conflict; 
that the fate of elections may depend on the issues taken by the can- 
didates with regard to parochial schools ; and that a lawsuit involving 
the freedom of Catholic teaching is at this very moment before the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, Moreover, in a few days, important meet- 
ings will be held in St. Louis ; great interests are at stake, and his 
modesty cannot blind him to the fact that his authority will have great 
weight, both with the hierarchy and with the laity. The importance 
of the question should, perhaps, have prompted him to give us sooner 
the benefit of his extensive learning ; nobody knows better than Dr. 
Bouquillon that the scientific treatment of moral questions involves 
very serious difficulties ; that a slight inaccuracy leads to dangerous 
consequences; and that a statement, perfectly clear to its author, is 
often misapprehended both by his friends and by his opponents. 

We wish more time had been given us to study and discuss the 
pamphlet. But as the matter stands, we have no choice, we must act 
on the spur of the moment ; the pamphlet reached us on the nineteenth, 
at a late hour, and the important meetings in which it must have great 

3 



weight will begin on the twenty-eighth. In so short a time we can- 
not do justice to the subject, compare all the quotations with the 
texts from which they are drawn, show how far they go in making 
good the peculiar conclusions at which the author has arrived. But 
if want of time and dearth of books prevent us from accomplishing 
all we fain would do, nothing forbids us to set forth our difficulties 
and objections. We shall do so freely ; happy shall we be if the 
Doctor's explanations enable us more firmly to grasp the true prin- 
ciples on which Catholic education is to be established and main- 
tained. After asking for explanations which, for us at least, are 
much needed, we shall make up for our deficiencies by quoting at 
length two of the standard writers whose names appear on pages 
5 and 6 of the pamphlet. The reader will be able to judge for him- 
self whether their principles and their conclusions always agree with 
those of the author of the pamphlet. 



THE PARENT FIRST. 



: §1. IS THE STATE CHRISTIAN OR UNCHRISTIAN? 

After perusing the pamphlet one cannot help asking : What is that 
State which is represented as one of the four owners of educational 
rights, and which stands forth as the general manager of the joint 
property ? Is it a Christian State united with the Church, obedient to 
her in things spiritual, and (although itself supreme in the temporal 
order) acknowledging her indirect authority when she calls on rulers 
to come to her assistance ? If so, we may acknowledge in the civil 
power not only the rights which essentially belong to it, but also those 
which may have been delegated to it by the Church. The brow of 
Charlemagne is glossy with the sacred unction. 

If the State be such as it is defined (p. ii), " not the people, but the 
social authority," — that is to say, a body of men who govern the peo- 
ple, and who may be individually very good Christians, and may even 
teach a Sunday-school, but who in their official capacity ignore the 
authority of the Church, and have no special use for Canon Law, then 
in order that arguments drawn from tlie Decretals or from Catholic 
theologians may be used to determine their powers, it is necessary to 
prove, first, that the powers attributed to the rulers are neither acci- 
dental nor derived from the Church, but are essential to the State pre- 
cisely because it is a social, autonomous, corporate body. We may 
live on excellent terms with our master, but we must not take him for 
Charlemagne.^ 

It might be alleged that the mistake would be without importance, 
•because the authority "is one and the same, and always and every- 
where has the same rights and attributes" (p. ii). This must not be 
taken to the letter, for it is evident that a physical or moral person 

' Vide Suarez (de legibus, L. 3, c. 11, n. 9). 
5 



that has delegated powers besides its own has more authority than 
one which must be content with the grants of nature. Moreover, the 
author himself (p. i8) has distinguished the essential from the acci- 
dental powers of the State, and has told us (p. 19) that " the duty of 
teaching is not for the State an essential duty." It is true that he adds 
that right goes beyond duty in this matter; but if right does not spring 
from an essential duty, it is necessarily conditioned by the essential 
duties of other physical or moral persons, namely, the parents and 
the Church. 

For these reasons we must beg of the reader to bear in mind the 
distinction which we have made : it is commonly found in theologians, 
and it is explained by Costa-Rosetti in the first corollary to his 171st 
thesis, p. 731. 

The author has reduced the subject-matter of his pamphlet to four 
questions: right to educate, mission to educate, authority over educa- 
tion, liberty of education ; in our observations we shall follow a some- 
what different order. As rights originate in duties, at least as far as 
man is concerned, we shall consider first the duty, then the rights, of 
the four claimants to educational privileges. Moreover, as the Church 
alone may be said in a strict sense to have received a mission to teach, 
we shall assume that with regard to other educators mission and duty 
mean the same thing. 

§2. HAS EVERYBODY A RIGHT TO EDUCATE? 

The first contention of our author is that every individual, every 
legitimate association, has by nature the right of educating. We 
vi^ould let this proposition pass unchallenged were it not for an equiv- 
ocation which might perplex readers less versed than Doctor Bou- 
quillon in matters of morals. ^ If education consisted only in com- 
municating to others the useful knowledge that each one may have 
acquired, then we also would say that each man may educate all those 
who of their own accord come to him for information. To communi- 
cate our knowledge to others, as far as may be useful, is a duty of 
charity, for we must do by them as we would wish them to do by our- 
selves; as a rule, it is a precept of charity, not a strict command of 
justice. Let us grant, then, that every individual man, and every 
lawfully constituted society, is entitled to give useful information, to 
teach, as long as persons are found willing to be taught by that indi- 
vidual or that society, without, however, overstepping the limits 
assigned by natural law or by Just civil laws. But education is a 
very different thing : it comprises, according to Costa-Rosetti and 



others, "all those functions which promote not only the preservation 
and development of the body, but also the perfection of the mind and 
the evolution both of the intellectual and of the moral powers." To 
educate is to exercise jurisdiction; it supposes authority in the edu- 
cator, and submission in the scholar. We deny that any.one has the 
right to educate the children of anybody else unless the parents give 
him that power. The reason is briefly this: jurisdiction (unless 
derived or delegated) cannot be found where the peculiar relation on 
which it is founded is wanting; but the peculiar relation on which the 
jurisdiction of parents is based is found in the parents only; therefore 
that jurisdiction can be found in nobody else except by derivation or 
delegation. The same thesis will be found in Jansen at the end of. 
this volume; moreover, we shall have occasion to dwell again on this 
topic. Of course this argument does not exclude a jurisdiction founded 
on another relation than paternity, a fortiori, on a title superior to it, 
such as a direct divine command; but it excludes all individuals, 
moral or physical, who would claim education against the will of the 
parents without showing a title superior to paternity. Moreover, it 
enables us to get rid of one of the claimants mentioned at the end of 
the pamphlet; those claimants are: the individual, physical and moral; 
the family, the State, the Church. We always thought that there were 
too many. We may leave as a consolation to the individual the right 
of teaching those who want to listen to him, just as the physician has 
the right to treat all the patients that apply to him, and the lawyer 
has the right to plead all the honest suits that he can get. 

Should we intentionally lead the reader to believe that the Doctor 
has done nothing more than prove a truism, we would be guilty of 
great injustice. There is really a school of so-called liberals who 
ignore natural law, and try to find in legality the fount of every right; 
against that school his arguments are decisive. The right of teaching 
comes primarily from natural law, the limitations come chiefly from 
positive law. But we want to emphasize the difference between mere 
teaching and education, because a confusion in this case is a fruitful 
source of sophisrns. It is also necessary to insist on this point: the 
right of teaching does not involve necessarily the obligation of hearing 
the teacher. Surely the right of healing the sick is based on nature 
itself, yet Esculapius cannot compel the sufferers to take his pellets. 

The quotations and references which adorn page 9 of the pamphlet 
are not levelled at the upholders of parental power, but at those who 
assert that the right of teaching is always delegated and derived from 
the ecclesiastical authority. We do not feel called upon to enter into 
that controversy. The reference to the treatise of Suarez {de Legibus) 



8 

brings before us all the subtle problems attending the modifications 
of natural law — not in its essence, which is immutable, but in its 
varied applications. This question alone would require a volume. 
This is not the time to discuss abstract theories: we must grapple at 
once with the difficulties which beset the live issues of the hour. 



§ 3. THE DUTY AND RIGHT OF THE PARENT. 

To whom does education, and especially elementary education, be- 
long ? We said, To the parent first. This is exactly what the Cardi- 
nal Archbishop of Rennes asserts in his catechism. We quote two of 
the questions: 

Q. With whom rests the 'right to educate children ? 

A. The right to educate children rests with their parents. 

Q. What is the duty of Christian parents with respect to the edu- 
cation of their children ? 

A. The first duty of Christian parents with respect to the educa- 
tion of their children is to see that they know and practise their 
religion. 

'^ The power of the parents over their children," says Blackstone, 
"is derived from their duty." 

Dr. Bouquillon does not dissent: " This right of parents" (the right 
of education) " is sacred, no one may suppress or duninish it" (the italics 
are ours); "for it springs from a paramount duty " (page 10, 1. 20). 

Leo XIII., quoted by Dr. Bouquillon, adds another feature. This 
right is inalienable: "In those duties which are assumed in the very 
act of imparting life, let the fathers know that many rights are con- 
tained, according both to nature and to justice. And those rights are 
of such a nature that man cannot in any particular either free him- 
self from their exercise or take away anything from the power of any 
other man; for to relax duties by which man is bound to God would 
be criminal on the part of man." 

These solemn words are the authoritative declaration of the con- 
clusions of ethics and of human law. According to Blackstone the 
duties of parents are, maintenance, protection, and education. 

Four evident reasons show that this threefold duty follows directly 
from natural law: First, every moral agent is accountable for the con- 
sequences of his own acts, so far as he can foresee them; on him it is 
incumbent to provide that those consequences be not hurtful, but bene- 
ficial. But the birth of the children is the result of an act of the free 
will of their parents. Therefore it is the bounden duty of the parents 



to see that the life which they have given be not a curse, but a bless- 
ing. It could not be a blessing were the duties mentioned, especially 
that of education, neglected; therefore it is the duty of the parents to 
provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of their children; 
and that duty would exist of necessity even if positive law should fail 
to sanction it; for even in that case the natural relation of parent to 
children would immutably subsist. Grotius, Puffendorf, and Black- 
stone use the same argument with some differences, which are not 
material; we will quote only Grotius: " It is a maxim of Aristotle that 
he who gives the form (i.e., the specific principle of activity) must 
give what the form requires. Therefore, he who has caused a man to 
exist must, as far as it is possible and necessary, secure to. him the 
things which are necessary for a human and social life — this being the 
kind of life to which man is born" {De jure belli et pads, 1. ii. c. 
vii. sec. 3). Immediately after, Grotius quotes several authorities, 
among others, Justinian, who says: "A natural impulse and instinct 
moves the parents to educate their children." 

Secondly. The chief end of nature in the marriage relation is to 
secure the continuance and perfection of the human race ; but this 
purpose would evidently be defeated if the three obligations above 
mentioned were neglected by the parents ; therefore these obligations 
are laid upon them by nature itself. Blackstone says : " The last duty 
of parents to their children is that of giving them an education suitable 
to their station in life ; a duty pointed out by reason, and of far the 
greatest importance of any. For, as Puffendorf very well observes, it is 
not easy to imagine or allow that a parent has conferred any consider- 
able benefit upon his child by bringing him into the world, if he after- 
wards entirely neglects his culture and education, and suffers him to 
grow up like a mere beast, to lead a life useless to others and shameful 
to himself " (Bk. I., c. 16). We must add that by this neglect the parent 
not only sins against the child and against society, but also thwarts 
the beneficent purpose of the Creator in instituting matrimony. 

Thirdly. A universal impulse which is not only rational and 
human, but which is reproduced in the instinct of animals, is, accord- 
ing to Roman jurisconsults and to reason itself, the unmistakable 
token of natural law. But such is the impulse of parents to accom- 
plish the three dutiesmentioned, and it finds its counterpart even in the 
instinct of animals. Therefore those duties are imposed by natural 
law. We quote in full the celebrated text of Ulpian: "Natural law 
is that which nature has taught all living beings, for it is not the 
exclusive property of man, but it reaches all the animals which live in 
the air, on the earth, or in the depths of the sea. Hence flow the union 



lO 

of man and woman which we call matrimony; hence the procreation 
of children; hence their educationy 

Fourthly. Where there is a special and natural fitness, there also 
is laid a special and natural duty; but parents have a special and 
natural fitness to educate their own children ; hence it is their 
special and natural duty. The minor premise is evidenced by obser- 
vation both of private and of social life. Nothing can supply the love 
of a mother or the mild firmness of a father. Young orphans are at a 
disadvantage from the start, as keen observers of human nature well 
know. In political life, history tells the same tale. One of the 
Grecian States, Sparta, sliifted the responsibility from the parents to 
the State. It interfered with nature's law, and the consequence was 
that Sparta did not produce a single poet, a single orator, a single 
statesman of superior ability — unless it be Solon, who invented the 
system, but was not reared according to it. For a time it had war- 
riors, but even those at last were wanting, and Sparta was conquei-ed 
by the other commonwealths, on which in the beginning she was wont 
to impose her will. Rome committed another fault — that of giving 
by law to the father an auchority which had no warrant in nature; but 
although she paid the forfeit in the end, yet she can boast of a succes- 
sion of great men down to the last period of decline. " The duties of 
parents to their children as being their natural guardians," says 
Chancellor Kent, "consist in maintaining and educating them during 
the season of infancy and youth, and making reasonable provision 
for their future usefulness and happiness in life, by a situation suited 
to their habits, and a competent provision for the exigencies of that 
situation. 

"The education of children in a manner suitable to their station 
and calling is another branch of parental duty, of imperfect obligation 
generally in the eye of municipal law, but of very great importance 
to the welfare of the State." 

For the better understanding of this passage I must observe that 
imperfect duty in ethics and in law means a duty which the holder of 
the corresponding right cannot enforce, or a duty based on fitness, but 
not on commutative justice. In our opinion the duties enumerated 
by Blackstone and Kent are imperatively demanded by strict justice, 
and therefore divo. perfect duties ; but, according to Kent, municipal law 
takes the view that the State is not bound to enforce them as long as 
their violation is not evident enough to become a public inconvenience 
From the standpoint of municipal law this view is correct. "Several 
of the States of antiquity," continues the eminent jurist, "were too 
solicitous to form their. youth for the various duties of civil life to en- 



II 

trust their education solely to the parents ; but this was upon the 
principle, totally inadmissible to the modern civilized world, of the 
absorption of the individual in the body-politic, and of his entire sub- 
jection to the despotism of the State" (Comment., lect. xxv.). 

"The father," says Blackstone, " may delegate part of his parental 
authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, 
who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the 
parent committed to his charge, namely, that of restraint and correc- 
tion, as may be necessary to answer the purpose for which he is 
employed." 

"The power of the parents over their children is derived from 
their duty." 

The learned Doctor would probably accept this doctrine, for he 
says himself (p. 9): 

" The end of conjugal society, one of the reasons for its stability, 
is the education no less than the procreation of children. Parents are 
called by God not only to generate children to bodily life, but also to 
form their minds ; therefore they are entitled to be the first instruct- 
ors of . their children, themselves, or through teachers of their own 
choosing." But at the end of the same page he makes an assertion 
which we must beg leave to call misleading. " On the other hand," 
says the Doctor, "the State, within the sphere of its powers, has a 
right of inspection over the education imparted by the family — the 
right to prevent it from becoming a source of moral poisoning." No 
doubt the State has a right to prevent education from becoming a 
source of moral poisoning, but does this involve the right of invading 
the privacy of the household ? Leo XIII. does not think so, for the 
Holy Father says: "The idea that the civil government should, at its 
own discretion, penetrate and pervade the family and the household, 
is a great and pernicious mistake" (Encycl. Reruni Novaruni). 

The sphere of civil authority is determined by its end, and it is 
described by the Doctor himself in the following lines : " The purpose 
of civil authority is : i. To maintain peace between citizens, protect 
their mutual rights, their legitimate activity ; 2. To supply the insuffi- 
ciency of individuals." Moreover, we must bear in mind that the 
direct object of social activity is not the individual but the social 
good, and that wrong must be exterior, and must visibly, thougli per- 
haps indirectly, attack society before the civil authority can take 
cognizance of it, and follow it within the precincts of the household. 
"If the citizens of a State, — that is to say, the families, — on entering 
into association and fellowship, experienced at the hand of the State 
hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of 



12 

being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than 
sought after" (Encycl. Rerum Novarut]i). 

In concluding these remarks on the right of parents to educate, 
we must observe: ist. That the family is a true society, anterior to 
every kind of State or nation, with rights and. duties of its own totally 
independent of the commonwealth (Encycl. already quoted). 2d. 
That since the household is anterior, both in idea and fact, to the 
gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must have rights 
and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more 
immediately on nature (ibid.). 3d. That the right of education is 
one of those rights, that it is inalienable, and that no man can either 
abridge or destroyit (Encycl. Officii sanctissum, Dec. 22, 1887). 4th. 
That the State cannot, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the 
family (Encycl, Rerum Novaruni). 5th. But if a family finds itself 
in great difficulty, utterly friendless and without help, it is right that 
extreme necessity be met by public aid. 6th. That if within the walls 
of the family there occur great disturbance of mutual rights, the 
public power must interfere to force each party to give the other 
what is due (ibid.). 7th. But the rulers must go no further ; nature 
bids them stop here (ibid.). Unless we retain a strong hold on these 
principles, all ethical and social theories referring to the family and to 
the State will be doomed to inextricable confusion. 



§ 4. MISSION OF THE CHURCH. 

" That the Church has the right to teach results from the words 
of Our Lord to the apostles, ' Docete omnes gentes.' The Church is 
essentially a teaching power " (p. 16). Yes, but she is an educating 
power as well : for she imparts spiritual life to her children, feeds 
them with the word of God and the living bread, watches over their 
spiritual growth, and brings them (as far as they let her) into the 
measure of the fulness of Christ ; she is a true and perfect mother ; 
she is also the best of educators. The passage from which we have 
taken the first words of this paragraph is admirable, and we do not 
think that Dr. Bouquillon would object to the few words we have 
added. 

The statement of the mission of the Church (p. 20), does not 
seem to strengthen the advocacy of her rights contained in the six- 
teenth page, yet it supplies us with the following significant passage : 
" In the presence of an education that is indifferent or hostile to 
religion, bishops found schools, colleges, academies, universities. 



^3 

Clearly this is a case of necessity^ regrettable necessity, implying the 
regret that the State is indifferent to Christianity in the premises." 

In the following lines the Doctor might have been more tender for 
those who assert that the Church has received the mission to teach 
human as well as divine science. It is but fair to state that they try 
to make good their interpretation of the celebrated text, " Go ye, 
therefore, and teach all nations," by bringing in the 13th verse of the 
sixteenth chapter of St. John, " But when the Spirit of truth is come. 
He will teach you all truth ;" but as the Doctor emphatically declares 
that the Church is indirectly endowed with the right to teach the 
sciences and letters, in so far as they are necessary or useful to the 
knowledge or practice of revelation, the question is more speculative 
than practical. 

But there is an omission that we regret. The Doctor does not 
speak of the mission of the Church with regard to those moral truths 
which belong to the natural order, but which the pagan philosophers 
have never fully known, and which modern pagans forget or distort. 
Shall we have a sort of morale civique? What shall be the foundation ? 
State Law, Utilitarianism, Altruism, Evolution ? It would have 
been good to state explicitly that the Church had the mission to teach 
those truths ; for, although they do not singly transcend natural rea- 
son, yet it is morally impossible for men to acquire the knowledge of 
all, and even to retain the knowledge once acquired, without the help 
of an infallible exponent. 



§ 5. THE SO-CALLED MISSION OF THE STATE. 

At the top of page 18 of the pamphlet we read the following cap- 
tion: The Mission to Educate incumbent on the State. When, where, by 
whom was this mission given ? We know that Our Lord said to His 
apostles : " Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations." Here is a clear, 
distinct, unequivocal command to teach, and from the context and the 
nature of the teaching it is evident that it is not bare teaching which 
is commanded, but the duty of educating is imposed. The Church 
has unquestionably a mission to educate. When was such a precept 
imposed on civil society ? Well, by mission the Doctor means duty. 
We need not quarrel about words ; and yet metaphorical expressions 
often confuse ideas instead of making them clearer. What is meant is 
that the State is bound to teach, not that it has some control over 

' The italics are ours. 



14 

education, not that it has the right to establish schools, but that it 
must be an educator. Let us see how this is proved. The author tells 
us that the purpose of civil authority is : ist, to maintain peace between 
citizens, protect their mutual rights, their legitimate activity ; 2d, to 
supply the insufficiency of individuals. To this double purpose cor- 
i-espond functions of a different order, some essential, and others ac- 
cidental. We are told moreover that the duty of teaching is not for 
the State an essential duty, it is accidental ; if individuals, families, 
associations have provided all the education that is necessary, the 
State is free to doff the teacher's gown. Moreover, its way of educating 
is to erect schools and appoint competent masters. And so this very 
scientific presentment of the thesis may be reduced to the simple state- 
ment : that, when schools and teachers are wanting, government must 
try to supply both. There can be no objection to this proposition : 
moreover it is easily proved. It is the secondary function of the govern- 
ment to supply the insufficiency of individuals — when schools and 
teachers are wanting, individuals are deficient. Therefore the State 
must supply both as far as the exchequer will allow. Candidly it was 
not necessary to bring St. Thomas, Mgr. Cavagnis, Professor Wilson, 
Messrs. Westel W. Willoughby and William P. Willoughby to tell us 
that. In a man less wealthy than the learned Professor, I would call 
this a waste of science. But the conclusion contains something more: 
''While saying that the State should provide instruction where indi- 
viduals fail to do so, we do not mean to say that the State may teach 
only when and where individuals fail to do their duty. The exercise 
of the duty of tlie State is allowable whenever the State judges the 
exercise of this duty to be useful, without being absolutely necessary." 
That is, the State may establish schools, even when tlie public could do 
without them. We would here beg leave to insert a remark of Jansen : 
" Private citizens, erecting schools at their own expense, are perfectly 
independent; but the government, using the money of the treasury 
which is obtained by taxation, must, as a faithful administrator, ob- 
serve distributive justice and make sure that the studies promoted are 
useful for the common good, and do not benefit one class only of 
citizens " (Thesis XLIX. Schol. i""-). Some late developments make 
this remark very timely. 

The mission of the State consists in erecting schools and supplying 
teachers when private enterprise is inadequate. But as the right 
" goes beyond the duty in this matter," let us consider the right of the 
State with regard to teaching. 

And first we must ask again whether the State is Christian or 
un-Christian — at least in its corporate capacit)^ Certainly Dr. Bou- 



15 

quillon does not consider the United States of America as coming 
under the rule laid down by Cavagnis, his favorite author : " Stales 
are parts of the Church, and as such are bound to procure the good of 
the whole" ("Nozioni di Diretto," etc., p. 231), In that duty we might 
find a good foundation for a right. But let us take up the arguments. 
The following is considered by the author as apodictical, and he says 
of the consequence : " We consider this conclusion as impregnable " 
(p. 12). The argument is substantially as follows : " Civil authority 
has the right to use all legitimate temporal means it judges necessary 
for the attainment of the temporal welfare of the Commonwealth. 
Now, among the most necessary means for the attainment of the 
temporal welfare of the Commonwealth is the diffusion of human 
knowledge. Therefore, civil authority lias the right to use the means 
necessary for the diffusion of such knowledge, that is to say, to teach 
it or to have it taught by capable agents." With regard to the 
major, we must ask what are the legitimate means? Are measures 
which infringe pre-existing and inalienable rights, such as those of 
parents, to be called legitimate? The Doctor would answer that no 
right is infringed, because the parents are free to send their children 
to the government schools or to keep them at home. If so, we are 
satisfied: but let this qualification go on record. We let pass the 
minor, although explanations might be useful; but the printer sends 
us notice that no work can be done on Thursday. The consequence 
of the argument is, unfortunately, double, for it is one thing to use the 
means necessary for the diffusion, — that is to say, to help, to encourage 
those wlio diffuse — and place the means at their disposal; it is another 
thing to teach directly, or through the medium of agents. Moreover, 
to teach directly or indirectly those who are willing to be taught, is to 
instructj the thing to be proved is that the State has the right to edu- 
cate. Now, to educate, one must form the minds and hearts of pupils 
and teach them morals. Now, does it not strike the Doctor that one 
who sets aside revelation makes himself unfit to teach Christian 
morals ? Nothing is left but to teach la morale civique — a doubtful sort 
of education. 

The Doctor tells us that the State cannot help teaching, because 
it exercises the judicial power. Now to pass a sentence is not gen- 
erally understood to be the same as to teach a school, and so we must 
beg leave to consider this argument as metaphorical. 

The Doctor proceeds to prove from history that Christian sovereigns 
have often established schools, and even universities, without waiting 
for the consent of the Church, and without eliciting from the Church 
any protestation. The argument evinces great learning, and we 



i6 

would be the last man to question the learning of our gifted friend (we 
hope the Doctor will not refuse us the title of friend, which is for us an 
object of legitimate pride). But we are compelled to say that his 
enumeration proves nothing, because those princes took the teaching 
of the Church as the moral basis of their institutions, acknowledged 
the right of inspection on the part of the bishops, and considered the 
Pontifical direction as supreme. The Doctor concludes his argu- 
ments as follows : " Finally, we have yet to learn that any pope has 
ever declared that the State went beyond its right in founding schools, 
provided the instruction be organized in the spirit of Christianity." Such a 
declaration would have been strange indeed ; but the popes have 
often condemned godless schools and godless education. But you 
will answer that you have expressly said that the State may not estab- 
lish Agnostic schools. Certainly. But what sort of schools can be 
established by a government which, in its corporate capacity, ignores 
revelation ? At best they can be but neutral. Well, the Holy Father, 
Leo XIII., saj's explicitly:' "The Church has always condemned 
mixed or neutral schooXsJ' — But the government will limit itself strictly 
to the teaching of secular matters. This is the very case embodied in 
the 48th proposition condemned in the Syllabus: "Catholics may 
approve a system of education according to which the training of the 
young is severed from the Catholic faith and from the power of the 
Church ; and which having for its only object the knowledge of 
natural sciences, aims only or chiefly at the ends of earthly social 
life." 

No one knows better than you do the import of the instruction 
sent by the Congregation of the Inquisition to all the bishops of 
the United States, November 24, 1875 (Cone. Bait. III., p. 279). 
That declaration, and the decrees of the council which it accom- 
panies, belong, as you know, to i\\e Jus canonicum novissimum. In that 
instruction, after having quoted a pontifical utterance in which those 
are condemned who send their children to schools unfriendly to the 
Catholic Church, the Congregation adds the following significant 
words: "As these teachings are founded both on natural and on 
divine law, they enunciate a universal principle and have a universal 
binding force wherever the same system is prevailing." 

As a commentary on the 48th proposition of the Syllabus, let me 
quote an authority who is equally revered by us both. In his latest 
work Cardinal Gibbons speaks as follows : 

" The religious and secular education of our children cannot be 
divorced from each other without inflicting a fatal wound upon the 

1 Letter to the French Bishops, 1884. 



17 

soul. The usual consequence of such a separation is to paralyze the 
moral faculties and to foment a spirit of indifference in matters of 
faith. Education is to the soul what food is to the body. The milk 
with which the infant is nourished at its mother's breast feeds not 
only its head, but permeates at the same time its heart and the other 
organs of tlie body. In like manner the intellectual and moral growth 
of our children should go hand in hand ; otherwise their education is 
shallow and fragmentary, and often proves a curse instead of a bless- 
ing" ("Christ. Her.," p. 493). 

Do I then condemn the State for erecting mixed or neutral schools ? 
No ; our rulers have on hand a bad bargain, and they often do what 
they can to meet its conditions without hurting any one: yet the bar- 
gain remains a bad one. But I am free to find fault with those Catho- 
lics who in the face of the repeated warnings of the highest authority 
in this world continue to send their children to mixed or neutral 
schools without necessity, without using the required prophylactics, 
without securing the authorization of the Ordinary. 

You may say that you speak of an ideal State and of ideal schools, 
and consequently take it for granted that the instruction is organized 
in the spirit of Christianity: this is where I am compelled to be at 
variance with you. We professors have a tendency which at times 
is mischievous. We are apt to soar to the tops of metaphysical peaks, 
and ignore the real issues that are debated at the foot of the moun- 
tain. You discoursed on an ideal State and ideal schools, but we have 
to deal with a concrete State, and schools w^hich do a great deal of con- 
crete damage by rapidly disintegrating all the creeds, and undermining 
the foundations of Christian moralitv. 



§ 6. STATE CONTROL. 

We have but one question of some importance to treat: it is the 
control of the State over free schools, or at least over the teaching of 
secular branches in those free schools. The author tells us that he 
has "no intention of defining when and under what conditions the 
State may or should put its authority into operation," for "that is a 
question of prudence and justice." We must observe that it becomes 
at times a question of validity, for authority exercised without justice 
is no authority at all. No authority is valid except within its own 
sphere. No authority can be put into operation except to attain the 
end for which it has been given; no authority can absorb a power 
which had a prior existence, and which rests more immediately on 
nature. Hence Leo XIII. tells us that the "parental authority can 



i8 

neither be absorbed by the State nor abolished by it, for it has the 
same origin as human life itself." Again the same pontiff says: "The 
Socialists, in setting aside the parent and introducing the providence 
of the State, act against natural justice, and threaten the very existence 
of family life." It must therefore be clearly understood that what- 
ever power the State may wield, it must leave intact the rights of the 
parents. What rights, then, remain to the State ? The right of sup- 
pressing immoral or treasonable teaching; the right of promoting edu- 
cation by supplying the means that private enterprise could not secure, 
and offering incentives to the learned; the right of standing in loco 
parentis when the parents are dead or notoriously vicious or cruel, and 
when there is no one bound to the child by closer or holier ties 
ready to claim its guardianship. This description of State control 
with regard to the child sums up substantially what can be deduced 
from the nature of State functions, without making them run against 
and interfere with the rights of that society which, as the Holy Father 
has it, "is anterior to every kind of State, and totally independent of 
the commonwealth" (Encyc. Rerum JVovarum). 

This control, of course, is indirect, and nothing will satisfy some 
philosophers but a direct control. As we have neither time nor space, 
we have left them to the tender mercies of Von Hammerstein, and his 
criticisms will be found in Appendix No. 2. 

Of a higher and more complete kind is the control of the Church; 
her mission is of the supernatural order: the duty of the family springs 
from natural law and from parental relations. The end of the 
Church is the union with Christ, and life everlasting. The end of the 
family is the procreation and education of children. Hence the civil 
power can claim ampler rights when it is in union with the ecclesias- 
tical authority, and acts under its direction. 

This is an observation which Dr. Bouquillon might' have made: it 
would have rendered his pamphlet far more useful. The authorities 
which he draws from canonical sources are all weakened by that fatal 
flaw. For instance, he quotes Lucidi (de Visitatione, tom. 11, c. 7, § 2, 
n. 207); the passage begins as follows: "It is to be regretted and 
vehemently to be deplored that supreme rulers have taken this de- 
partment from the bishops. No-wonder if the foundations of t^mpires 
are quaking and if the princes fall from their thrones. . . . We do not 
mean to wrest from the civil power all control and right of patronage 
with regard to science, chiefly with regard to physical sciences, espe- 
cially when (as sometimes happens) they have no connection with re- 
ligion, and to give the whole authority to the Church," etc. He gives 
us the constitution of Leo XII., in which it is ordered that schools 



'9 

should be opened in every city by the magistrates; but those schools 
must be under the authority of the bishops, the students must make 
an annual retreat, etc., etc. Give us schools of this kind by all means; 
they shall never be condemned by the Church, and magistrates under 
episcopal jurisdiction are welcome to quizz the students. 

Dr. Bouquillon would seem to claim direct control for the State: 
he pleads that it is of great importance for the commonwealth that 
men should be well instructed; therefore the control of instruction 
should belong to the State. He proves too much. It is of great im- 
portance to the State that the citizens should be well off: therefore 
the State should have control of property. It is important that cit- 
izens should be healthy: this depends in a great measure on cook- 
ing ; therefore the State should have the control of the kitchen, etc., 
etc. The general answer is this : The department of the State is to 
promote, the welfare of the commonwealth by social means, not by 
■controlling directly individual activity, much less by invading family 
rights ; individual activity and family rights are simply outside of its 
sphere of action, and it would be a fatal error either to hamper the 
■one or to violate the other ; by so doing the State would sap the 
foundation of its own prosperity. 

Costa-Rosetti (theses 175-176) holds this doctrine, and refers to 
thesis 174, where he proves that individual and personal goods do 
not formally and directly belong to the sphere of civil authority, 
•although civil authority may indirectly reach them: instruction \s per 
■se an individual good, hence the control over it on the part of the State 
is only indirect. Since Dr. Bouquillon has quoted Prof. Wilson, 
Messrs. Westel W. Willoughby and William P. Willoughby, we may 
be allowed to bring in a quotation from John Stuart Mill, which 
seems to express the common-sense view of the question. 

"One thing must be strenuously insisted on — that the government 
-must claim no monopoly for its education either in its higher or lower 
branches, must exert neither authority nor influence to induce the 
people to resort to its teachers in preference to others, and must confer 
no peculiar advantages on those who have been instructed by them. . . . 
It is not endurable that a government should, either in law or in fact, 
have a complete control over the education of the people. To possess 
such a control and actually exert it is to be despotic. A government 
which can mould the opinion and sentiments of the people from their 
youth upwards can do with them whatever it pleases." 

Many other questions we should like to treat, but time and space 
forbid. One word more, however, about the power which the learned 
Doctor grants to the State to exact a minimum of instruction. He 



20 

says that if you grant to the State power over cases of neglect, you 
must grant it also the power to define a minimum: this does not 
follow. The State may punish parents who starve their children, or 
leave them in a state of destitution with regard to clothing ; yet will 
you allow the State to determine by law how many ounces of food 
must be given to the children, and what sort of clothing they shall 
wear? We may as well repair at once to Icaria, to Salentum, or 
to Utopia. Tlie fact is that all those matters are relative, undefinable 
a priori, and requiring State intervention only when there is a public 
wrong committed ; and the existence of that public wrong must be 
determined by the judge on the individual merits of the case. The 
learned Doctor admits that the Civilta and Costa Rosetti are against 
him, but he rules them out of court on the ground that their reason- 
ings seem to him very faulty. It would have been fairer to let us 
know what those reasonings are. First let us state the thesis.; it is as 
follows : " Considering natural law'only, parents cannot be compelled 
by the civil authority to send their children to an elementary school. 
But they may be obliged in particular cases." This is not exactly 
the contradictory of the Doctor's position. Let us state briefly the 
reasons of Rosetti. 

First, parents alone are judges of the material and intellectual wants 
of their children; the control is due to them in strict justice : an obliga- 
tion of that kind is an abridgment of their control; and therefore a vio- 
lation of justice. Secondly, the only reason why the State could inter- 
fere would be the violation of the right of the child; but all the child 
is strictly entitled to is to receive the education necessary to live in 
comfort in the condition of his parents. On the other hand, it is 
not universally true that the three R's are necessary to live in com- 
fort; hence it cannot be proved by natural law alone that the par- 
ents can be compelled to give their children a knowledge of the 
three R's. The author adds, that ignorance, though itself an evil, 
often saves men from great dangers which result from the reading of 
bad books, etc., etc. 

In point of fact, neither Rosetti nor any other Catholic writer 
objects to knowledge : they object to State programmes and to com- 
pulsion. They object to State interference in domestic affairs, and 
whenever the government leaves its imperial duties to cross the 
family threshold, Catholic writers resent the intrusion and bid the 
rulers halt. Moreover, they fully know that he who can make and 
unmake programmes of studies can crush competition and rule the 
social forces for his own private ends. 

Dr. Bouquillon tells us at the end of his pamphlet that there are 



21 

four claimants to the right of educating children : the individual, the 
parent, the State, the Church. He leaves to the hierarchy the duty 
to harmonize their contending claims. He might have been bolder, 
and the hierarchy would have thanked him for it: it is in such 
learned men as the distinguished professor that they seek the comfort 
afforded by distinct and unfaltering assertions of truth. May we not 
reject one of the claimants, the individual, moral or physical ? We 
remain with three: the parent, the Church, and the State. The pa- 
rent has the priority both in concept and in fact. The Church has the 
supreme direction, because she has the noblest end and the most 
sacred mission. By her side stands the State, aiming at the public 
good without interfering with private or domestic rights, but ready 
to answer the call of the humblest member of society, ever watching 
over that order on which depend the peace and happiness of nations. 



THREE THESES OF JANSEN 

ON THE 

SCHOOL QUESTION. 

{De Facultate Docendi Jnstitutiones Juridicae.) 



THESIS XXI. 
Parents alone have the right of education. 

I. 

For if, by the natural law, God has imposed upon them, before 

any other person or persons, the duty of education, surely it stands 

to reason that it is not lawful for others to put obstacles in 
From duty. , . , , ^ , . . . , 

their way, or to rob them to any extent of this privilege. 

They enjoy also the same liberty in specifying the method of educa- 
tion, since he who has a right in the substance of a thing has also 
the corresponding right in the mode which accompanies the sub- 
stance. 

II. 

Again, the right itself being entirely dependent on rela- 

Froni the . , . , . . r i ,• • i i 

nature of the tions peculiar to the constitution of the family, the parents 
ami y. alone can be judges in the matter. 

III. 

Finally, the liberty of the family would be infringed, nay, wholly 
abolished, by the interference of another power. The unity of educa- 
tion, and consequently education itself, would be at an end, 
TOn?iu*s^ons* since that education which would be acceptable to the 
parents would often miss its aim, owing to the interference 
of a contrary system. And this by the very force of nature itself, 

22 



23 

from which the two contending powers would have sprung, — a suppo- 
sition entirely out of keeping with the order of nature. Therefore, 
parents have the sole right in education, and consequently they alone 
can derive from the order of nature that authority which is indispens- 
able for the performance of their duty. Hence Grotius has justly 
said, '* Parents are by nature educators" (1. ii. c. 20).' 

But since instruction is nothing but a part of education, these same 

parents have alone the natural right of instructing their children : and 

it is their right also to determine the limits and method of 

Instrnction. 

that instruction. 
Scholion. — Therefore, although the duty of education is not im- 
posed upon parents by a law of strict justice, yet those who place ob- 
Persoiiai stacles to the exercise of the paternal power infringe upon 

authority. justice, since they take away from the parents something 
that is exclusively their own. Lugo's teaching is to the point : 

"The power of directing belongs to the parents ; hence, he who 
takes from the father this power takes from him something that be- 
longs to him, and commits an injustice, since he deprives the father of 
something useful. For it cannot be denied that to possess such a power 
is useful to the father, because, though the father's command ought 
to be directed to the good of the child, yet the right to command for 
his own good redounds to the benefit of the father. It is an advantage 
to him to exercise his power in the interest of his son." — De jure et just. 
Disp. L.S.I., n. 13. 

IV. 

It is with perfect right that parents call their children theu- own, 
and hold them as such. For, insomuch as the children owe obedience 
to their parents alone and have not yet the full use of their 
belong to the faculties, they are not yet fully independent or sui juris. 
pareii &. There is, besides, the fact that parents are, both in physical and 

moral order, the source of the children's life. For these reasons, we 
should not be surprised at the extent of the authority that is vested in 
the parents, and wonder why they exercise a liberty almost unlimited 
in the government of their children ; for the Author of nature, who 
has entrusted to them this liberty, has protected it against abuse both 
by a certain division of power between father and mother, and by a 
strong natural tendency, owing to which the parents, of their own ac- 
cord, in spite of every difficulty, seek the good of their children, and 
really consider the good of the little ones as their own. To this 

^ The word used by Grotius is magistratus, from "magister." 



24 

care, instinctive in the natural order, God has appointed a further 
safeguard in the supernatural order, which perfects nature and gives 
it a supernatural aim. In this matter we can easily see, from its 
mode of acting, what prudence the Church has always observed in 
securing at the same time the safety of the child and the liberty of 
the family. It uses at first, for a long time, moral means only ; and 
it is only in an extreme case that it has recourse to compulsory 
measures against unnatural parents. 



THESIS XXII. 



" It is not lawful for any one to instruct children unless he has obtained from the 
parents the authority or the right of teaching." 



There is no doubt that it is indispensable for a teacher to have 
authority over his young pupil ; for instruction, and espe- 

Instraction. .hi' • • • r ^ • 

cially elementary instruction, is a part of education, and 
without this authority it cannot be carried out. " Who," says 
Lactantius, "can educate children unless he has the power of a 
master over them ? " {Divin. InsL, 1. iv. c. 3. Migne vi. 455). But if 
there is question of the order of nature, there is no one except the 
parents that is by natural riglit endowed with this power. Since it is 
vain to expect this authorit}'^ from fhe voluntary submission of the 
child itself, inasmuch as it is not yet in the full exercise of its own 

rights, it only remains to ask from the parents the needed 
HwChurchf power. If there is question of the supernatural order, the 

proposition must be restricted ; for the ministers of the 
Church, whose office it is to give moral and especially religious instruc- 
tion to the children, with or without the consent of the parents, do so 
on their own authority, which God has conferred upon them with a 
view to the salvation of men. But if we consider tlie question of 
literary instruction apart from religion, then the ministers of the 
Church cannot impart this kind of instruction, except in the name of 
the parents. If the parents, tlierefore, considered it necessary, or even 
useful, to send their children, together with those of the same locality, 
to a school, and place them under the care of one teacher, they should 
diligently inquire whether this school is of such a character as to 
justify them in entrusting to it their children ; moreover, they should 
take every precaution to ward off whatever could endanger the child's 



25 

salvation. Wherefore they should hold in abhorrence that school 
where such a danger would arise, either from the character or religion 
of the teacher, from the defect of the method, or from the companion- 
ship of school-fellows. Should there be any ground for suspicion, 
they should prefer to see their children remain ignorant rather than 
grow wicked. It is evident that it is not lawful for them to send their 
children to neutral schools, for they are prohibited from doing so by 
the natural law as well as by the precept of the Church. Ecclesiastical 
authorit)'' has the right to tolerate exceptions in those cases where the 
danger of perversion is removed or counteracted, and when a sufficient 
reason is given for attending such schools. Tliis is in accordance 
with the instruction sent to the bishops of America, June 30th, 1875, 
by the Congregation of the Inquisition. 



THESIS XXXIII. 



In the performance of their duty with regard to education, parents are not at 
all subject to State control. 



I. 

The title of the State to claim that control should be derived 
from the duty to maintain the rights of its subjects, from the ob- 
ligation to promote the public welfare, or lastly, from the right to 
maintain its own existence : none of those sources can be assigned to 
State control. For if we consider the first, children can claim in strict 
justice nothing but what is necessary to human life — we have shown 
this in other parts of this work ; hence, children have no strict right to 
higher instruction or to the expenses that this higher instruction entails 
on the parents. Hence the civil power cannot penetrate and pervade 
the family and the household under the plea that it must protect the 
rights of its subjects. Nay, more ; this very duty forbids interference, 
for such is the constitution of the family that the head of the house- 
hold enjoys full administrative freedom on his own responsibiIit3^ 
This freedom, far from impeding, the mighty arm of the State must 
protect. Nor can the right of control be based on the second plea ; 
for it requires that those things be accomplished by the State which 
exceed the power of the citizens in their individual capacity, and which 
for this reason must be left to the State, which controls greater re- 



26 

sources. But the business of education is sucli that, according to the 
divine will, it must be carried on by the parents themselves ; or, if 
entrusted to others, it must remain under the unceasing control and 
responsibility of the parents. For let the kind reader bear in mind 
that the duty of education is laid upon the parents in so divine a 
manner that they can never entirely free themselves from it. Without 
their consent, any other person, even the ruler of the Commonwealth, 
is without authority. If the reason alleged proves anything, it goes 
to show that the government must, when circumstances require, place 
at the disposal of the parents the means to fulfil their duty with 
greater facility. Lastly, the argument which the ruler might draw 
from the duty of self-preservation is nugatory. For nobody will deny 
that it is the interest of the Commonwealth that the parents should 
educate their children in the best manner possible ; for the Common- 
wealth needs valiant soldiers, and citizens imbued with respect for 
authority, a deep sense of justice, and a love for social liarmony. Al- 
though those blessings flow chiefly from education, we cannot con- 
clude that education must be subject to Stale control. For that cannot 
be a State right which conflicts, by its very nature, with social order. 
That order is so designed by its divine author that its very elements are 
drawn from the order of the household ; for the family, considered in its 
nature, is prior in existence, and the same thing may be said of parental 
authority. But this priority is an evident token of the will of God that 
parental authority should not depend on the State, but that it is left 
to the family itself, under the guidance of a natural impulse, so to 
perfect its members that they may become valuable social elements. 
Moreover, the principle advanced by our opponents would, if it were 
true, utterly destroy civil society, because it would transfer to the 
government, not only parental but also conjugal authority ; for there 
is almost nothing within the domestic circle concerning the rearing 
and education of children which, according to this rule, could not be 
claimed by the government as subject to its control. 



II. 

The duty of education is of such a nature that it requires the ten- 
derest charity ; for without the living principle of love, it is utterly 
unfit to accomplish its mission. But the civil control, proceeding by 
compulsory laws, strips this duty of its loving character. Now, it is 
the nature of man to do reluctantly what he does under compulsion. 
Moreover, in that case, man will often do less than he is really bound 



27 

to do, and thus Government will defeat the purpose of its laws by its 
own interference, 

III. 

Order within the household requires that children should be per- 
fectly obedient to their parents, and grateful for the education which 
they receive. But if parents gave it under compulsion, the children 
could not help thinking that the benefit conferred is nothing but the 
payment of a debt. We can find an illustration in the laws which 
restrict the liberty of parents in the making of wills. The legal re- 
striction leads the children to think that they can, even during their 
parents' life, claim as their own a part of the father's property. A sad 
experience has shown how much such legislation relaxes the family ties. 
But as even greater perils would attend the enactment of laws which 
would make the giving of education compulsory on the part of the 
parents, government interference must be condemned. 

IV. 

Lastly, this compulsory legislation, to have any value, ought to 
meet the wants and the conditions peculiar to different families ; for 
the nature and the measure of education must be adapted to the va- 
rious circumstances in which families are placed. What is enough for 
a child belonging to one family may be totally inadequate for a child 
belonging to another. Nay, the law, to be practically enforced, should 
be so well defined that it could reach all the individual cases ; but the 
deepest lawgiver would not attempt to frame such a law with regard 
to education. We conclude that the constitution of the household, the 
nature of political authority, and the special features of the duty of 
education, make it imperative to leave full liberty to the family. 



RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS WITH REGARD TO 
THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN. 

{Hammer st ein, De Ecdesia et Statu, p. i8i.) 



I. 

We have seen the relations between the Church and the State in 
regard to the first element of human society, that is, matrimony. Let 
us now examine these relations with regard to the second element of 
human society, that, namely, which flows from matrimony — the family, 
I mean: and thus we come to consider the relations existing between 
parents and children. 

In the first place, it must be noted that, as in matrimony religion 
holds the most prominent place, so in the family, which is the result 
of matrimony, religion is above all else. Whence it follows that the 
relations that subsist between parents and children are under ecclesi- 
astical rather than State jurisdiction, though not so exclusively as in 
the case of the relation between husband and wife. The reason of 
the exclusive dependence of the latter on the Church is that matri- 
mony constitutes a sacrament, while the relation between parents and 
children does not. Yet the chief obligation and right of parents, 
namely, education, for another reason, is chiefly under the authority 
of the Church, because Christ appointed the Church to teach and 
direct all men. 

As little need be said on other points that concern the family, we 
shall consider carefully a few points in regard to education, and par- 
ticularly in regard to the subject of instruction and of schools, which 
impart both education and instruction. Three agents concur — the 

88 



29 

parents, the State, the Church. Let us see what are the functions of 
each. 



II. 

The parents have the obligation of education and all the rights of 
education before the Church and the State, and in this sense, that 
even before the existence of any State or Church the parents could 
and ought to educate and instruct their children, and if need be to 
send them to school. Let us suppose that neither is yet existing. 
Should the children then born live without education until the State 
should arise or until a Church should be founded ? Or could any 
one else be designated that should educate and instruct the children ? 
As a consequence, parents have the right to compel their children to 
learn what is necessary and useful ; they have the right to compel 
them to go to such a school as they may appoint ; they have the right 
to punish if the children refuse to obey. Without these rights there 
can be no sound education. 

The parents therefore have the right of excluding the interference 
of all others who might wish to educate their children or in some way 
to hinder them in the performance of their duty by forcing on them 
methods which to the parents seem inconsistent with the proper kind 
of education : without this privilege, their right would be a mockery. 

However, one condition is to be observed : parents have the right 
to exclude others, unless such others can prove that they also have 
some right over the education of the children. 



III. 

In our times the State is that agency which attempts to interfere in 
the education of the children by controlling the schools. Let us ex- 
amine with what right it does this. We cannot deny that the State 
or Commonwealth has some rights in regard to the schools and the 
education of children. It is the State's duty to supply what is want- 
ing on the part of the family. Hence, in the first place, it can offer 
means to parents whereby they may better and more easily provide 
for their children's education. This the State does by founding and 
endowing schools according to the needs and wishes of the parents. 
But with regard to endowments, or any other form of assistance, the 
State has no riglitto give them unless they contribute to the public 
good, to which they certainly do not contribute if sufficient provision 



30 

has already been made for the schools in other ways, as, for instance, 
through the medium of religious orders. 

In the second place, the State may supplement the family in edu- 
cating the children, if need be, compelling negligent parents to fulfil 
their obligations in this regard. 

In the third place, the State may so far supplement the family as 
to take upon itself the education, in the case of orphans, for instance 
or if, for any reasons, the parents themselves cannot educate their chil- 
dren. This, however, supposes that those also are unable to supply 
the education who, next to the parents, and in preference to the State, 
have the right and duty to fill the place of parents, namely, relatives, 
a municipal organization, or the Church (where the Church does 
exist). 

In the fourth place, the question suggests itself whether, beyond 
the duty of supplementing the family, the State has a direct right, 
jointly with the family, of educating the children, in so far as to have 
the right to compel parents to send their children to certain appointed 
schools — those, for instance, under State control ; or in so far as to 
have the exclusive right to establish schools; or, in a word, to educate 
and to teach ; or finally, in so far as to have the right to insist upon a 
certain method of education, a certain kind of school, or a certain 
amount of matter, which all are bound to learn, — matter, I mean, in 
excess of what is absolutely necessary ; for to omit this would, of 
course, be sheer negligence. 



IV. 

Danton implicitly held this doctrine, declaring that children belong 
to the State before they belong to parents; but we must absolutely 
deny this direct right of the State in conjunction with the parents. It 
is altogether outside of the domain of the State ; and, as a conse- 
quence, whatever would flow from such an assumption would be out- 
side of State right. The reason for this is that the assumed right rests 
on mere assertion, without any solid reason to support the claim. 

Let us, however, view the reasons that are brought forward. 
Cousin, in the French Senate in 1833, said : 

"The law which makes elementary instruction obligatory, it seems 
to me, does not exceed the rights of the legislative power any more 
than the law of military service and that other law just passed, the 
law, namely, of forced expropriation for purposes of public utility. If 
the demands of public utility entitle the legislator to invade the rights 



31 

of ownership, why should not utility, in a much higher order, entitle 
him to do that which is less — namely, to require that children receive 
the instruction that every one needs to prevent him from becoming a 
source of injury to human society." 

We might give our assent, to a certain extent, to these last words, 
taking them in their ordinary sense, namely, that the State has a right 
to insist that the children receive, in some way, such education as is 
absolutely necessary. But more than this seems to be contained in 
these words, not perhaps in the mind of the distinguished orator, or 
at least in the minds of those who are in the habit of using similar 
arguments; for they say that the State can require every one to receive 
such instruction as is generally called elementary; this, as a matter of 
fact, in our day, means many things altogether superfluous and even 
hurtful. I know for a fact a State in which the sons and daughters of 
country-people are compelled, in their elementary instruction, to learn 
the mythology of Greece. The defenders of these principles would 
also maintain the right of the State to exact the reception of this ele- 
mentary instruction in no other schools than those established by the 
State ; but they cannot prove this right of the State by any such 
reasons as the above. 

For, in the first place, the violation of parental rights in the forced 
attendance of the children' at certain appointed schools, against the 
will of parents, is far greater than the violation of the rights of prop- 
erty which is inflicted by the appropriation of an estate which the 
State needs, for instance to build a railway. In the second place, the 
conscription of men for military service is to be admitted to be a 
serious invasion of the rights of human liberty — as serious, perhaps, as 
the drafting of children into the public schools ; and for this reason it 
is not practised either in England or in America. But such conscrip- 
tion can be defended on the ground of the absolute necessities of the 
case, because that State which would neglect to levy soldiers could not 
defend itself against a neighboring State provided with a superior 
army. 

V. 

But let us meet our Prussian opponents on the same ground, for it 
is probably in Prussia more than anywhere else that the rights of 
parents have been invaded. 

Trendelenburg claims for the State the right to see " that the same 
moral principles sway the minds of all. . . . Thus the State, by its very 
nature, is educator." 



32 

This assertion we completely den)^ It is indeed the will of God 
that there should be a certain conformity of principles, not only be- 
tween the members of the same Commonwealth, but even between 
all the members of the human race. But this conformity is suf- 
ficiently secured by the very fact that all the parents bring up their 
children in their respective national principles. For instance, English 
parents will impart to their children English ideas ; but should a French 
or German family dwell in England, doubtless the English government 
would have no right to send the children of that family to English 
schools to imbibe English ideas, should the parents prefer French or 
German schools. 

Stahl of Berlin says : " Education and instruction emanate both 
from parental authority and from State power : from the parents as 
far as tlie culture of the individual, from the State as far as it is 
national." 

Let us test the soundness of this proposition by applying it to a 
similar subject-matter. Let us say : " The administration of property 
flows both from the right of dominion and from the power of the State. 
From the former, in so much as it is for the benefit of the individual 
owner, from the latter in so much as it is the interest of the State that 
the citizens be wealthy." Would such a proposition be admitted? 
Doubtless, it is the interest of the State that the citizens should be 
rich ; but this does not justify the State in wresting from the citizens 
the administration of their property, or compelling them to administer 
it according to this or that method. A pari, it benefits the State that 
the citizens be well-behaved or even learned ; but this does not give it 
the right to take the education from the father or to determine bylaw 
the methods, the schools, or the teachers. 

I shall add an argument of charming simplicity, brought forward 
by Juergen Bona Meyer, the Bonn professor. According to him 

"The people itself transfers to the State the right and assigns to 
the State the duty to promote the instruction of the people, and all 
other improvements whatever, by all the means it can control. Natu- 
rally, therefore, to the State power, jointly with the popular power, be- 
longs an absolute right to determine the extent and duration of that 
compulsory training." 

By the way, according to Meyer, boys to the age of seventeen inclu- 
sively and girls to the age of sixteen inclusively, should be compelled 
to attend school. 

Magnificent ! But we will ask the learned professor one question : 
Can he show us the document, executed before a notary public and in 



33 

presence of witnesses, b\' wliicli the parents have transferred to the 
State the right of educating their children? Until lie can show us 
this document, we must be allowed to have some doubt with reeard 
to its existence. 

Those repeated and strange attempts to prove that the State owns, 
jointly with the parents, or even above the parents, the right to edu- 
cate, and to compel the attendance of children, show clearly that the 
right cannot be made good, and therefore has no existence. The con- 
clusion is that the parents hold the right of training and instructing 
their children as they judge fit and through masters of their own selec- 
tion, provided that they do not overstep the boundaries of reason : 
should they disregard the behests of reason, then, indeed, the State, as 
the civil superior, may provide for the education of the children. 

The freedom of the family, sad to say, is now, in accordance with 
socialistic theories, too often infringed even by those who otherwise 
abhor socialism. For it is a socialistic system to transfer to the State 
the rights of individuals and the rights of families. And it is in ac- 
cordance with that system to assail the rights which ought to be most 
sacred to the State: we speak of the rights of parents over their 
children. 



VI. 

Having thus determined the relative functions of the family and 
of the State, we must come to the Church, which has received its mis- 
sion from Christ, when our Lord said: " Go ye, therefore, and teach all 
nations, . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have 
commanded you." This mission comprises two mandates: the first, to 
teach faith and confer Baptism ; the second, to teach men to observe 
all things whatsoever Christ has commanded — that is, to direct the 
moral practice. Therefore, to the Church has been committed by 
Christ the care of instructing and training all men in faith and 
morals^ — that is, in religious matters. 

Hence arises a relation which we have often mentioned: the whole 
education with regard to faith and morals — that is, with regard to re- 
ligion — falls directly under the authority of the Church ; but as relig- 
ious training is by far the most important part of education and in- 
struction, the Church has also an indirect f^o^N^v over the rest. To both 
rights, direct -eLwdi indirect, the children themselves must yield submis- 
sion and obedience ; for the Church, in the religious order, is, as it 
were, the mother of the children which it has brought forth to super- 
natural life by Baptism. Parents also are subject to both rights, so 



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LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 



030 218 741 1 9 



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that in the whole work of education they depend directly or indirectly 
on Church authority. Civil organizations, and the State itself are also 
subject to the Church in so far as both in common schools and in the 
institutes in which the youth are trained for the public service: 
the Church may interfere directly in religious and moral questions, 
and indirectly in other matters, lest dangers threatening the faith or 
morals of its children should come from evil-minded masters, bad 
books, or bad associations. 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ^ 



030 218 741 1 



